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Abstract 
This paper investigates the performance differences across and within foreign-owned firms and domestic 
multinationals in Italy. Used for the empirical analysis are non-parametric tests based on the concept of 
first order stochastic dominance and quantile regression technique. The firm-level analysis distinguishes 
between foreign-owned firms of different nationalities and domestic MNEs according to the location of 
their FDI, and it focuses not only on productivity but also on differences in average wages, capital 
intensity, and financial and non-financial indicators, namely ROS, ROI and debt leverage. Overall, the 
results provide evidence of remarkable heterogeneity across and within multinationals. In particular, it 
seems not possible to identify a clear foreign advantage at least in terms of productivity, because foreign-
owned firms do not outperform domestic multinationals. Interesting results are obtained when focusing 
on ROS and ROI, where the profitability gaps change as one moves from the bottom to the top of the 
conditional distribution. Domestic multinationals investing only in developed countries present higher 
ROS and ROI compared with the subgroups of foreign-owned firms, but only at the lower quantiles, 
while at the upper quantiles the advantage seems to favour foreign firms. Finally, in regard to domestic 
multinationals, there is strong evidence that those active only in less developed countries persistently 
exhibit the worst performances.  
JEL Classification: F23, D21, L10 
Keywords: Multinationals, Performance indicators, Heterogeneity, Quantile Regression 
1.  Introduction and Literature Background 
Several studies based on firm or plant level data have documented the growing 
importance of firm heterogeneity. The pioneering works in this area focus on 
comparison between exporters and non-exporters (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Clerides 
et al., 1998; Delgado et al., 2002), documenting that the former tend to outperform the 
latter. Recently, also foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an important issue in 
the discussion on heterogeneity. In this regard, the main prediction considered in 
empirical studies is that productivity differences among firms have a role in explaining 
the presence of domestic firms, exporting firms and investing firms (Helpman et al., 
2004; Head and Ries, 2003). This is consistent with the self-selection hypothesis 
suggesting that firms engaged in some kind of foreign activity need to have some ex-
ante advantages in order to deal with the costs and the complexities of international 
markets. This idea has clear links with the consolidated literature on multinationals and 
according to which one reason why firms invest abroad is their desire to exploit firm-
specific advantages in host countries (Markusen, 1995; Caves, 1996). 
The paper builds on this analysis and conducts empirical discussion on the less 
explored issue of heterogeneity across and within multinationals in Italy.  
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  Only a few studies in the literature explore the role of firm heterogeneity in 
explaining the relationships between productivity and internationalization strategies, 
comparing foreign affiliates and domestic firms and distinguishing the latter between 
non-multinational and multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Castellani and Zanfei, 2006; 
Temouri et al., 2008; Criscuolo and Martin, 2009; Doms and Jensen, 1998). These 
studies find essentially that foreign affiliates exhibit higher productivity than domestic 
non-MNEs, while foreign and domestic MNEs differ only marginally. Thus, in 
explaining the better productivity performance of MNEs, some of their advantages are 
more important than foreign ownership advantages per se. Regarding Italy, Castellani 
and Zanfei (2006) show that foreign-owned firms outperform domestic firms, but the 
gap disappears when foreign firms and domestic MNEs are compared. Moreover, US 
foreign firms perform better than affiliates from other countries, and they exhibit 
productivity levels similar to those of domestic MNEs. In a different work (2007), 
Castellani and Zanfei find that domestic multinationals with production activities abroad 
exhibit higher productivity as well as better innovation performance than multinationals 
with only non-production activities abroad. Overall, MNEs are characterized by better 
performances than exporters and domestic firms. However, the analyses in that work do 
not include foreign-owned firms. 
Finally, there are two studies that focus on productivity spillover from foreign 
investment and which employ the same econometric techniques as used in this paper: 
Dimelis and Louri (2002) and Kosteas (2008). The former examines data on Greek 
firms to find a positive effect on the labour productivity of fully or majority owned 
foreign affiliates. The latter study uses data on Mexican manufacturing plants to 
distinguish among FDI from North America, Canada, and the rest of the world. 
Kosteas finds that Canadian-owned plants yield higher spillovers than other foreign-
owned plants, suggesting a large amount of heterogeneity among inward FDI. Both 
papers, however, focus on spillover effects and do not analyze performance differences 
in great detail: for example, they do not have information on outward investment and 
concentrate only on productivity. 
This paper makes two contributions to the empirical literature. Firstly, it presents 
a detailed analysis of the role of multinationality in explaining heterogeneity, focusing in 
particular on differences between foreign-owned firms and domestic MNEs in Italian 
manufacturing industries. Much of the analysis in this area has hitherto focused on 
productivity differences. This study furnishes additional insight into the issue of 
heterogeneity by investigating not only productivity but also average wages, capital 
intensity, as well as various measures of non-financial and financial performance, such 
as return on sales (ROS), return on investment (ROI), and debt leverage. The 
advantages of these three indicators are that they are easy to calculate and, especially, 
that their definitions are agreed and well-known: traditionally in the international 
business literature, the success of a company has been examined using these measures 
(Tangen, 2003).  
Secondly, the paper highlights the differences in performance among 
multinationals. To address this issue it distinguishes between foreign-owned firms of 
different nationalities and domestic MNEs according to the locality of their FDI. The 
nationality of foreign-owned firms may be crucial for understanding whether there is a 
performance leader among them. Such leadership, for instance, may be the consequence Mara Grasseni, Domestic Multinationals and Foreign-Owned Firms in Italy: Evidence from Quantile 
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of an advantage of the home country compared to another. Performance gaps may exist 
even within domestic multinationals: in fact, the choice of the geographical areas in 
which affiliates are established may reflect distinct structural characteristics as well as 
distinct motivations.  
The empirical analysis reported by the paper is performed using Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests of stochastic dominance and by applying Quantile Regression Technique 
(QR). The non-parametric tests compare the cumulative distribution of the variable for 
different types of firms and not just the mean. The QR permits evaluation of the 
differences across and within multinationals at different points of the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable. Therefore, if one acknowledges that 
multinationals are heterogeneous, there are reasons to suspect that the differences 
across and within firms do not need to be the same across the performance 
distributions. On the contrary, ordinary least squares method (OLS) assumes that the 
conditional distribution of the performance variables is homogeneous.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
characteristics of the sample and describes the econometric framework. The results are 
presented in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes. 
2.  Data and Empirical Model 
2.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
Used for the empirical investigation of the issue of heterogeneity across and 
within multinationals operating in Italy during the 1990s is the “Centro Studi Luca 
D’Agliano-Reprint” dataset resulting from merging the Reprint dataset of Politecnico of 
Milan, which contains information on foreign affiliates (FO) and domestic 
multinationals (MNE
D) with the AIDA database of Bureau Van Dijck, which provides 
balance sheet data and other economic data on Italian firms.
3  
An useful feature of the dataset is that it stated the nationalities of foreign firms, 
thus making it possible to distinguish in the empirical study among US, European and 
Other foreign-owned firms (FO
US, FO
Europe and FO
Other). Moreover, regarding domestic 
multinationals, the dataset provides information on the country of localisation of their 
foreign subsidiaries, permitting comparative analysis among the different characteristics 
of domestic multinationals investing only in developed countries, investing only in less 
developed countries, and investing in both (MNE
D_DC, MNE
D_LDC, MNE
D_Both).
4 
Owing to limited information on the localisation of outward investment and given 
that observations for balance sheet data are missing , the econometric analysis is 
conducted using an unbalanced panel which includes data on foreign firms and 
domestic multinationals, with at least one foreign subsidiary, for the years 1995 and 
1997. 
                                                 
3 The two groups of firms, FO and MNED, are separated in the dataset. Which means that a firm cannot 
be foreign owned and also invest in other countries.  
4 Unfortunately, the dataset does not provide information neither on domestic firms serving only the 
domestic market nor on exporters.  
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The variables used in the empirical analysis are: labour productivity, defined as 
value added per employee; average wages; capital intensity, defined as total tangible 
assets over number of employees; return on sales, ROS; return on investment, ROI; and 
debt leverage, Leverage, defined as total debt over equity.  
An overview of the distribution of firms by firm type, nationalities and 
localization of FDI and sectors is provided by Table 1, where firms are classified 
according to the Pavitt classification among traditional, high returns to scale, specialized, 
and high-tech sectors. 
In 1995, around 40% of domestic MNEs have subsidiaries located only in 
developed countries. There is the same percentage for outward investment in less 
developed countries, while only 19.6% of domestic MNEs have higher international 
involvement by adopting the strategy of investing in developed countries as well as in 
less developed ones. In 1997 there is an increase in the number of Italian firms choosing 
to invest abroad, but this rise essentially concerns firms with subsidiaries located in 
LDC.
5  
In regard to the ownerships of foreign affiliates, in 1995 about 70% of them have 
European nationality and about 24% are from the US. In 1997 the foreign firms in Italy 
increase in number, but the percentage composition does not change. Overall, these 
stylised facts are not particularly surprising and confirm the great amount of foreign 
direct investment that takes place among developed countries, and especially among 
European countries.  
Table 1 also gives an overview of the sectoral distribution of firms. In the sample, 
the highest percentage of domestic MNEs are active in high return to scale sectors, 
around 40%, and traditional sectors, around 30%. The former have foreign subsidiaries 
especially in DC, around 50%, while the latter invest mainly in LDC, around 66%. 
Foreign-owned firms are more concentrated in high return to scale sectors, around 56%, 
and specialised sectors, around 22%; and in both sectors most FO have European 
nationality.  
                                                 
5 Closer inspection of the foreign markets in which foreign affiliates are localised shows that Europe is 
the area in which the greater number of domestic multinationals invest. Among the less developed 
countries, the which receives most outward FDI are those of East Europe. However, in 1997 there is 
an increase of outward FDI in every area considered, but the most substantial rises are in less 
developed countries. The most interesting result seems to be the increase in the number of domestic 
MNEs investing in Asia, 81.8%, while there is also a remarkable growth in the number of firms that 
invest in more than one less developed area, in particular Asia and East Europe, 87.5%. However, the 
absolute number of firms in these cases is fairly small.  
 Mara Grasseni, Domestic Multinationals and Foreign-Owned Firms in Italy: Evidence from Quantile 
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Table 1. Distribution of Domestic Multinationals and Foreign Owned Firms 
 MNED FO  MNED_DC MNED_LDC MNED_Both FOUS FOEurope FOOther
1995 403  933 
161  
(40%) 
163  
(40.4%) 
79  
(19.6%) 
219 
(23.5%) 
657  
(70.4%) 
57 
(6.1%)
1997  496  1149 
183  
(37%) 
218  
(44%) 
95  
(19%) 
279 
(24.3%) 
796  
(69.3%) 
74  
(6.4%)
Traditional Sectors 
1995 
118  
(29.3%) 
130  
(14%) 
20  
(17%) 
76  
(64.4%) 
22  
(18.6%) 
23  
(17.7%) 
96  
(73.8%) 
11  
(8.5%)
1997 
153  
(30.8%) 
158  
(13.8%) 
30  
(19.6%) 
101  
(66%) 
22  
(14.4%) 
29  
(18.4% 
117  
(74%) 
12  
(7.6%)
High Return to Scale Sectors 
1995 
166  
(42.2%) 
530  
(56.8%) 
89  
(53.6%) 
44  
(26.5%) 
33  
(19.9%) 
125  
(23.6%) 
377  
(71.1%) 
28  
(5.3%)
1997 
193  
(38.9%) 
649  
(56.5%) 
90  
(46.6%) 
63 
(32.7%) 
40  
(20.7%) 
157  
(24.2%) 
450  
(69.3%) 
42  
(6.5%)
Specialised Sectors 
1995 
97  
(24%) 
210  
(22.5%) 
42  
(43.3%) 
36  
(37.1%) 
19  
(19.6%) 
58  
(27.6%) 
138  
(65.7%) 
14  
(6.7%)
1997 
119  
(24%) 
261  
(22.7%) 
50  
(42%) 
41  
(34.5%) 
28  
(23.5%) 
73  
(28%) 
172  
(66%) 
16  
(6%) 
High-Tech Sectors 
1995 
22  
(5.5%)  
63  
(6.7%) 
10  
(45.5%) 
7  
(31.8%) 
5  
(22.7%) 
13  
(20.6%) 
46  
(73%) 
4  
(6.4%)
1997 
31  
(6.3%) 
81  
(7%) 
13  
(42%) 
13  
(42%) 
5  
(16%) 
20  
(24.7%) 
57  
(70.4%) 
4  
(4.9%)
Note: MNED and FO represent domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates, respectively, MNED_DC, MNED_LDC and 
MNED_Both represent domestic multinationals investing only in developed countries, investing only in less developed countries 
and investing in both developed and less developed countries, respectively. FOUS, FOEurope and FOOther represent foreign 
affiliates from US, Europe and Other countries. 
 
Table 2 reports mean and standard deviations of the key variables employed, for 
foreign owned firms, domestic multinationals and their subgroups. These basic statistics  
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reveal that, in both years, foreign firms are on average more productive than domestic 
multinationals, pay higher wages, exhibit higher capital intensity, and are more indebted. 
FO also exhibit a higher return on sales, ROS, and a higher return on investment, ROI, 
but only in 1997. However, the t-test for equality of means shows that there are 
considerable differences between FO and MNE
D only with regard to labour 
productivity, at least in 1997, and to the average wages paid, while there is no evidence 
of statistically significant differences in regard to the other variables.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 MNE
D FO   
1995 
Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
T-test for equality of mean* 
Labour productivity  121.25 (74.92) 124.60 (63.85) 0.8347 (0.404) 
Average wage  63.44 (20.03)  71.48 (20.66)  6.5884 (0.000) 
Capital intensity  85.60 (115.06) 99.63 (165.62) 1.5469 (0.1221) 
ROS  0.057 (0.088)  0.046 (0.119)  -1.6398 (0.1013) 
ROI  0.068 (0.080)  0.063 (0.098)  -0.8870 (0.3753) 
Leverage  18.79 (37.50)  24.84 (202.97) 0.5941 (0.5526) 
1997 
Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
T-test for equality of mean* 
Labour productivity  112.45 (63.10) 121.84 (61.14) 2.8309 (0.0047) 
Average wage  64.34 (20.19)  72.12 (20.48)  7.0991 (0.0000) 
Capital intensity  94.89 (160.72) 97.32 (155.29) 0.2887 (0.7729) 
ROS  0.036 (0.240)  0.042 (0.094)  0.7091 (0.4783) 
ROI  0.051 (0.074)  0.056 (0.102)  0.8401 (0.4010) 
Leverage  21.29 (73.24)  29.70 (329.06) 0.5633 (0.5733) 
* The values in parentheses are the p-values for the t-test Mara Grasseni, Domestic Multinationals and Foreign-Owned Firms in Italy: Evidence from Quantile 
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Even if the t-tests provide us with preliminary information on the differences 
among firms, the mean is only one moment in the statistical distribution. Therefore, 
because the purpose of this study is to analyze the heterogeneity among multinational 
firms, it is more interesting to focus on the entire distribution of the variables, rather 
than just on the unconditional mean. Hence, in order to conduct further comparison 
among the characteristics of the two groups – foreign-owned firms versus domestic 
multinationals – non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, K-S, for first order 
stochastic dominance are performed.
6 Establishing stochastic dominance implies that 
one cumulative distribution lies to the right of another, but K-S tests check that 
statistically robust differences exist between the distributions.
7 The results reported in 
Table 3 show some interesting findings that do not always confirm the evidence 
provided by the unconditional mean.  
In both years, the labour productivity distribution of FO firms stochastically 
dominates that of domestic MNEs, providing strong evidence that foreign-owned firms 
are more productive than domestic multinational firms. The same pattern emerges on 
inspecting the wage distributions, proving, in line with the literature, that foreign firms 
pay higher wages, and at the capital intensity distribution, or at least did so in 1997. 
By contrast, the Italian multinationals seem to be characterized by higher ROS 
than foreign-owned firms, but they are more indebted as well.
8 With reference to the 
ROI variable, the non-parametric test provides evidence that the complete distribution 
of a variable gives much more interesting explanations of the discrepancies between 
groups of firms. In fact, the test shows that there are statistically significant differences 
between the two distributions of FO and MNE
D, but it is less clear which group 
stochastically dominates the other. This finding counsels caution and may indicate that 
the dominance changes along the distribution.
9 Given this large amount of 
heterogeneity, further analysis is necessary, and the QR approach should shed more 
light on these different patterns.  
                                                 
6 Only few studies in the literature specifically perform K-S tests. See, e.g. Girma et al. (2005), Girma et al. 
(2004) and Merino (2004). 
7 The graphs of cumulative distributions are not reported but are available from the author upon request. 
8 Interestingly, these results are not always in line with the simple mean, confirming the large amount of 
heterogeneity existing among firms and the need for analyses to consider the entire distribution of the 
variables.  
9 This pattern is also confirmed by the graph of the cumulative distributions.   
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Table 3. Kolmogorov – Smirnov tests for comparison between FO firms and MNED  
Difference favourable to: 
 Equality  of  distributions 
FO MNE
D 
Labour Productivity       
1995  0.0930 (0.015)  0.0222 (0.759)  -0.0930 (0.008) 
1997  0.1076 (0.001)  0.0080 (0.956)  -0.1076 (0.000) 
Average wage       
1995  0.2405 (0.000)  0.0054 (0.984)  -0.2405 (0.000) 
1997  0.2268 (0.000)  0.0080 (0.956)  -0.2268 (0.000) 
Capital Intensity       
1995  0.0708 (0.119)  0.0108 (0.937)  -0.0708 (0.059) 
1997  0.0660 (0.097)  0.0300 (0.536)  -0.0660 (0.049) 
ROS      
1995  0.1362 (0.000)  0.1362 (0.000)  -0.0369 (0.464) 
1997  0.1013 (0.002)  0.1013 (0.001)  -0.0433 (0.274) 
ROI      
1995  0.1270 (0.000)  0.1270 (0.000)  -0.0670 (0.080) 
1997  0.0880 (0.009)  0.0880 (0.005)  -0.0865 (0.006) 
Leverage      
1995  0.1476 (0.000)  0.1476 (0.000)  -0.0068 (0.974) 
1997  0.1733 (0.000)  0.1733 (0.000)  -0.0114 (0.914) 
P-values are in parentheses.  
 
The evidence reported above does not account for differences in sector 
characteristics, which may be crucial for better disentanglement of the performance 
differences among groups of firms. Consequently, K-S tests are performed for each of 
the four Pavitt sectors, and the results are reported in Table 4. The importance of 
heterogeneity is strongly confirmed even across sectors. The labour productivity and 
capital intensity distributions of FO firms stochastically dominate those of domestic 
MNEs, but only in traditional sectors, while there is no evidence of better performance 
in the other ones. The higher average wages paid by FO firms are established in all 
sectors except for specialized sectors. Finally, MNEs outperform FO firms in terms of 
ROS and ROI in all sectors except for high-tech ones, and the same pattern is found in 
terms of leverage.  Mara Grasseni, Domestic Multinationals and Foreign-Owned Firms in Italy: Evidence from Quantile 
Regression 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
69
Table 4. Kolmogorov – Smirnov tests for comparison between FO firms and MNED according to the 
Pavitt-classification 
Difference favourable to: 
   Equality of 
distributions  FO MNED 
Traditional sectors 
Labour Productivity  1995  0.1675 (0.062)  0.0771 (0.480)  -0.1675 (0.031) 
  1997  0.2285 (0.001)  0.0202 (0.938)  -0.2285 (0.000) 
Average wage  1995  0.3565 (0.000)  0.0053 (0.996)  -0.3565 (0.000) 
  1997  0.3823 (0.000)  0.0063 (0.994)  -0.3823 (0.000) 
Capital Intensity  1995  0.1567 (0.096)  0.0553 (0.685)  -0.1567 (0.048) 
  1997  0.1390 (0.099)  0.0606 (0.565)  -0.1390 (0.050) 
ROS 1995  0.2232  (0.004)  0.2232  (0.002) -0.0283  (0.906) 
  1997  0.1279 (0.157)  0.1279 (0.078)  -0.0998 (0.212) 
ROI 1995  0.2402  (0.002)  0.2402  (0.001) -0.0592  (0.648) 
  1997  0.1634 (0.031)  0.1634 (0.016)  -0.1004 (0.208) 
Leverage 1995  0.2177  (0.006)  0.2177 (0.003)  0.0000 (1.000) 
  1997  0.2037 (0.003)  0.2037 (0.002)  0.0000 (1.000) 
High Return to Scale Sectors 
Labour Productivity  1995  0.0973 (0.182)  0.0208 (0.896)  -0.0973 (0.091) 
  1997  0.0803 (0.292)  0.0111 (0.964) -0.0803  (0.147) 
Average wage  1995  0.2078 (0.000)  0.0094 (0.978)  -0.2078 (0.000) 
  1997  0.1841 (0.000)  0.0087 (0.978) -0.1841  (0.000) 
Capital Intensity  1995  0.1038 (0.131)  0.0038 (0.996)  -0.1038 (0.066) 
  1997  0.0812 (0.280)  0.0502 (0.472) -0.0812  (0.141) 
ROS  1995  0.1120 (0.084)  0.1120 (0.042)  -0.0397 (0.672) 
  1997  0.1298 (0.014)  0.1298 (0.007) -0.0383  (0.648) 
ROI  1995  0.1107 (0.090)  0.1107 (0.045)  -0.0825 (0.179) 
  1997  0.1152 (0.039)  0.1152 (0.019) -0.0874  (0.103) 
Leverage  1995  0.1335 (0.022)  0.1335 (0.011)  -0.0163 (0.935) 
  1997  0.1864 (0.000)  0.1864 (0.000) -0.0252  (0.828) 
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Specialised Sectors 
Labour Productivity  1995  0.0636 (0.896)  0.0636 (0.516)  -0.0346 (0.822) 
  1997  0.0973 (0.182)  0.0208 (0.896)  -0.0973 (0.091) 
Average wage  1995  0.1154 (0.340)  0.0087 (0.990)  -0.1154 (0.171) 
  1997  0.0993 (0.396)  0.0307 (0.858)  -0.0993 (0.200) 
Capital Intensity  1995  0.1004 (0.515)  0.1004 (0.262)  -0.0325 (0.869) 
  1997  0.1942 (0.004)  0.1942 (0.002)  -0.0300 (0.863) 
ROS 1995  0.2266  (0.002)  0.2266  (0.001) -0.0492  (0.725) 
  1997  0.0794 (0.681)  0.0794 (0.357)  -0.0230 (0.917) 
ROI 1995  0.1748  (0.035)  0.1748  (0.017) -0.0977  (0.282) 
  1997  0.1123 (0.254)  0.0831 (0.324)  -0.1123 (0.127) 
Leverage 1995  0.2270  (0.002)  0.2270 (0.001)  -0.0270 (0.908) 
  1997  0.2332 (0.000)  0.2332 (0.000)  -0.0362 (0.807) 
High-Tech Sectors 
Labour Productivity  1995  0.1710 (0.727)  0.0635 (0.877)  -0.1710 (0.385) 
  1997  0.2075 (0.289)  0.1004 (0.637) -0.2075  (0.145) 
Average wage  1995  0.3211 (0.069)  0.0952 (0.744)  -0.3211 (0.035) 
  1997  0.3138 (0.024)  0.0721 (0.792) -0.3138  (0.012) 
Capital Intensity  1995  0.1154 (0.982)  0.1154 (0.648)  -0.0620 (0.882) 
  1997  0.1581 (0.630)  0.1581 (0.326) -0.0522  (0.885) 
ROS  1995  0.1962 (0.556)  0.1962 (0.285)  -0.0570 (0.899) 
  1997  0.1533 (0.668)  0.1533 (0.349) -0.0920  (0.684) 
ROI  1995  0.2258 (0.376)  0.2258 (0.190)  -0.1140 (0.655) 
  1997  0.0988 (0.981)  0.0490 (0.898) -0.0988  (0.646) 
Leverage  1995  0.1457 (0.879)  0.1457 (0.500)  -0.1118 (0.665) 
  1997  0.1724 (0.518)  0.1724 (0.264) -0.0199  (0.982) 
P-values are in parenthesis.  Mara Grasseni, Domestic Multinationals and Foreign-Owned Firms in Italy: Evidence from Quantile 
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2.2 Econometric Analysis 
Discussed in the previous section are the different characteristics of foreign and 
domestic multinationals, with the focus on the unconditional mean or on all the 
moments of the distribution of each variable considered. However, the differences 
illustrated may reflect a number of firms’ characteristics. Hence, in order to take account 
of these sources of heterogeneity, an econometric analysis has been performed. The 
approach taken follows the standard procedure developed in previous studies (e.g. 
Bernard and Jensen, 1999). Hence, in an attempt to identify potential differences 
between foreign-owned firms and domestic MNEs, we estimate a regression of the 
form:  
 
it t it it it it Time Industry Size FO X ε θ γ δ β α + + + + + = ln     (1) 
 
Where i and t are firms and time subscripts; the dependent variable Xit refers to 
the performance indicators of the firms; FOit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if 
the firm is foreign owned. Sizeit  are dummy variables measured by the number of 
employees;
10 Industryit are two-digit sector dummies; Timet is a time dummy and εit is the 
error term.
11 β, δ, γ, and θ represent the parameters to be estimated, and, in particular, β 
denotes the differences between the performance of foreign owned firms and domestic 
MNEs.  
 To shed more light on performance differences, we estimate a second 
specification which differs only in the way firms are classified. Foreign firms are divided 
into three foreign ownership groups: firms owned by the United States, FO
US, firms 
owned by European countries, FO
Europe, and firms owned by countries in the rest of the 
world, FO
Other. Further, the specification distinguishes between subgroups of domestic 
MNEs according to the localisation of their outward FDI. Therefore domestic MNEs 
are grouped as follows: multinationals that own subsidiaries only in developed countries, 
MNE
D_DC, multinationals that own subsidiaries only in less developed countries, 
MNE
D_LDC, and multinationals that own subsidiaries in both developed and less 
developed countries, MNE
D_Both. In the second specification MNE
D_DC acts as reference 
group.  
  On the one hand, we may expect FO firms to be more productive than their 
counterparts because multinational corporations are more likely to establish affiliates in 
more productive industries and buy the more productive firms. The performance 
advantages may differ according to the nationality of the parent firm, because the 
performance of an affiliate may depend largely on the characteristics of its home system. 
Moreover, given the state of? the Italian economy, foreign firms may seek to invest in 
Italy in order to exploit existing firm-specific advantages, and not acquire them from 
local firms.  
                                                 
10 We define the following size classes: Small: 1-50 employees, Medium: 51-150 employees, Medium-
Large: 151-350 employees and Large: 351employees or more. 
11 When the dependent variable is the labour productivity, the log of capital intensity is added as control.  
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On the other hand, in regard to outward FDI, domestic multinationals may have 
different characteristics according to the geographical areas in which they invest. This 
highlights the issue of vertical and horizontal FDI. According to the literature, the 
vertical pattern occurs when a multinational fragments the production process in 
foreign countries where the relative cost of factors is lower. This means that we may 
suppose that investments in less developed countries are likely to follow the vertical 
model. By contrast, the horizontal pattern arises when the same production process 
takes place in several countries. Since most horizontal FDI flows are among countries 
which are similar in size and relative endowments, we may suppose that investments in 
developed countries follow the horizontal model. These two patterns highlight two 
production strategies that may reflect different firms’ characteristics. For instance, one 
may expect that there exists self-selection even within domestic multinationals: for 
example, MNE
D_DC  may have better ex-ante performances compared to those of 
MNE
D_LDC because they have to face a higher competition in developed countries. 
  The empirical exercise performed has its own complications. Firstly, the use of 
labour productivity raises econometric problems, such as endogeneity issues. However, 
as several studies make use of labour productivity, the choice of this variable may be 
useful for the purposes of comparison. Secondly, in the regression with capital intensity 
and average wages as dependent variables control should have made for outsourcing, 
given that the MNE
D_LDC may have different characteristics because they outsourced 
their more labour-intensive production processes. Unfortunately, the dataset does not 
contain a variable for outsourcing, so that it is only possible to construct a sort of 
measure of vertical integration defined as value added over sales and add it as control 
variable in the regressions. The results, however, do not change significantly along the 
distributions.
12 Finally, it is not possible to control for export because the dataset does 
not contain this information. Given these drawbacks, caution is necessary when 
interpreting the results. 
The two specifications are estimated by using conditional quantile regression 
technique, QR. The descriptive statistics have shown a great amount of heterogeneity 
between foreign-owned firms and domestic multinationals, so that the OLS technique 
may not be adequate. To account for some of the heterogeneity in the data, observed 
firm-level characteristics (i.e. size, sectors, etc.) are explicitly introduced into the 
regression model. At any rate, heterogeneity may also arise from firm characteristics that 
cannot easily be observed and accounted for. If unobserved heterogeneity exists, as 
happened in our estimations, the dependent variable in equation (1) and the error term 
may be independently, but not identically, distributed across firms. In this case, when 
the assumption of normality is violated, the coefficients estimated with OLS are not 
representative of the entire conditional distribution. Particularly in the presence of long 
tails, the outliers strongly influence the estimations. By contrast, the QR method is 
considered efficient and robust.
13 In the presence of heterogeneity this approach seems 
not only more appropriate but also more interesting, because it yields a more precise 
picture of the dynamics of the performance measures at different points of the 
                                                 
12 The results are not reported but are available from the author on request. 
13 See Dimelis and Louri (2002), Mata and Machado (1996). Mara Grasseni, Domestic Multinationals and Foreign-Owned Firms in Italy: Evidence from Quantile 
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conditional distribution, rather than at the conditional mean. For example, if we 
acknowledge that firms are heterogeneous, we may surmise that the productivity 
advantage of one group of firms, namely foreign owned firms, compared with another, 
domestic multinationals, may differ if we consider firms with low productivity levels 
with respect to firms with high productivity levels. In other words, if we use the OLS 
method, we assume that the conditional distribution of the dependent variable is 
homogeneous, which implies that we consider the advantages of a group to be the same 
at each point of the conditional distribution of the performance. This may be a rather 
restrictive assumption because we may expect that if there exists a positive performance 
effect associated with different groups, it will be different for firms with low, medium or 
high performances.  
For comparison, however, in a first step of the econometric analysis, the model is 
also estimated by OLS. 
3.  Results  
Tables 5-10 report the results for the two specifications of equation (1) using QR 
at five quantiles, namely 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90. Overall, the statistical significance and the 
values of the coefficients estimated differ widely across quantiles; and compared to the 
benchmark results from the OLS regression, they bear out the adoption of the QR 
technique. Figure 1 in the Appendix plots the coefficients across quantiles for each of 
the FDI variables in the second specification.
14 Even if interpretation of the results 
requires caution, as explained in the previous section, the analysis performed is able to 
shed more light on the relationship between performance and internationalisation.  
In regard to productivity, Table 5 shows that the first specification does not find 
evidence that foreign-owned firms are more productive than domestic MNEs. The FO 
dummy coefficient is not statistically significant across the entire conditional distribution 
and the productivity premia for FO prove to be negative at 75
th and 90
th percentile.  
The second specification, with more detailed classification of the firms and with 
MNE
D_DC as the reference group, shows an interesting pattern. In particular, foreign-
owned firms do not outperform MNE
D_DC; on the contrary, FO
Europe and FO
Other seem 
less productive than MNE
D_DC. The coefficients of FO
Europe are statistically significant 
only at the upper quantile, 75
th and 90
th percentile, and the loss ranges between 7% and 
11%. This may be interpreted as evidence that if there is any productivity advantage for 
MNE
D_DC it appears to favour only firms with higher productivity. The coefficients of 
FO
Other are statistically significant only at the 25
th and 50
th percentile, and the value of the 
coefficient decreases across the conditional distribution. These patterns confirm the 
prediction that the distinction of foreign-owned firms regardless of nationality is 
important when evaluating the existence of productivity advantages.  
Remarkable results also emerge when distinguishing among domestic MNEs. 
There is strong evidence that Italian MNEs investing only in less developed countries 
are less productive than those investing only in developed countries, while there is no 
                                                 
14 The graphs are useful for illustrating the trend of the variable estimated across the entire conditional 
distribution. But, they unfortunately are unable to identify whether the coefficients are statistically 
significant. The graphs also show the values of the coefficients estimated at nine percentiles.   
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evidence of a positive effect on productivity for MNE
D_Both with respect to MNE
D_DC. 
The coefficients of MNE
D_LDC are statistically significant across the entire distribution, 
and the loss ranges between 9% and 14.6%. However, in regard to the value of the 
coefficients estimated, an F-test of equality is used to determine whether these 
coefficients are statistically different across quantiles. The prob-values of the test are 
reported in Table 1 in the Appendix, and they do not provide evidence of differences in 
the magnitude of the MNE
D_LDC dummy coefficients across the distribution; in fact, the 
null hypothesis of equality between pairwise quantile is not rejected for each pairwise 
comparison. 
The results on productivity premia point to two interesting conclusions. Firstly, 
the empirical analysis provides further insights into the productivity and multinationality 
status relationship, and its findings are substantially in line with other evidence on Italian 
firms (Castellani and Zanfei, 2006) pointing out that foreign-owned firms and domestic 
MNEs differ only marginally.
15 In fact, the estimated coefficients do not show a foreign 
ownership advantage in favour of FO
US compared with domestic MNEs investing only 
in DC. On the contrary, MNE
D_DC tend to outperform FO
Europe at the upper quantile, 
and FO
Other at the lower quantile, and in the middle of the labour productivity 
distribution. This finding confirms the large amount of heterogeneity even within 
foreign-owned firms. Secondly, and more interestingly, the results are in line with the 
hypothesis put forward by Head and Ries (2003) that least productive firms are more 
likely to invest in less developed countries characterised by low factor costs.
16  
Finally, the coefficients of the capital intensity are positive and statistically 
significant, indicating a contribution to enhancement of labour productivity. The size 
dummies, included to capture some differences in productivity by scale of plant, exhibit 
a noteworthy result. The small firms have higher labour productivity than the large ones 
at the 50
th, 75
th and 90
th percentile, while the coefficients of medium firms are positive 
and statistically significant at the 75
th and 90
th percentile. At the 10
th percentile the 
pattern is reversed: the coefficients are negative. This indicates that if we focus attention 
on the most productive firms, small and medium firms achieve better performances 
than large ones. The result is not surprising if we consider that the Italian economy is 
characterized by small and medium firms which adopt the strategies of investing abroad 
and becoming multinational. 
                                                 
15 Temouri et al. (2008) reach similar conclusions when comparing German MNEs and foreign-owned 
affiliates. 
16 The low-productivity firms may be more attracted to relocating production to low-cost foreign 
countries because they make more intensive use of the factor whose overseas price is low. Mara Grasseni, Domestic Multinationals and Foreign-Owned Firms in Italy: Evidence from Quantile 
Regression 
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Table 5 Dependent variable: log Labour Productivity 
 QR  OLS 
 10  25  50 
(Median) 75 90 Mean 
Specification 1 (Reference group: MNED)   
FO  0.009 
(0.021) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.018) 
-0.0007 
(0.023) 
-0.040 
(0.041) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
Specification 2 (Reference group: MNED_DC)   
MNED_LDC   -0.146** 
(0.071) 
-0.089*** 
(0.034) 
-0.089** 
(0.037) 
-0.130*** 
(0.049) 
-0.118* 
(0.068) 
-0.114*** 
(0.035) 
MNED_Both  -0.005 
(0.064) 
-0.013 
(0.043) 
0.007 
(0.037) 
-0.005 
(0.054) 
0.025 
(0.098) 
0.001 
(0.042) 
FOUS  0.012 
(0.063) 
-0.001 
(0.029) 
0.020 
(0.034) 
0.047 
(0.040) 
0.095 
(0.062) 
0.039 
(0.031) 
FOEurope  -0.055 
(0.053) 
-0.040 
(0.026) 
-0.028 
(0.027) 
-0.071** 
(0.035) 
-0.112** 
(0.044) 
-0.064** 
(0.026) 
FOOther  -0.195* 
(0.106) 
-0.163*** 
(0.058) 
-0.104* 
(0.056) 
0.002 
(0.066) 
0.036 
(0.081) 
-0.094* 
(0.051) 
ln(K/L)  0.122*** 
(0.021) 
0.136*** 
(0.011) 
0.140*** 
(0.011) 
0.142*** 
(0.013) 
0.142*** 
(0.017) 
0.132*** 
(0.011) 
Small   -0.117** 
(0.052) 
-0.011 
(0.030) 
0.074*** 
(0.026) 
0.197*** 
(0.035) 
0.300*** 
(0.042) 
0.081*** 
(0.025) 
Medium   -0.083** 
(0.041) 
-0.035 
(0.022) 
0.002 
(0.020) 
0.076** 
(0.030) 
0.111*** 
(0.041) 
0.003 
(0.021) 
Medium- Large  -0.059 
(0.037) 
-0.037 
(0.023) 
-0.176 
(0.021) 
0.011 
(0.029) 
0.013 
(0.040) 
-0.035* 
(0.020) 
Time dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector 
dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Obs.  2981  2981  2981  2981  2981  2981 
Note: Standard error boostrapped with 500 replications in parentheses. Robust standard error for the OLS method.  
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10,5, 1 percent level.  
 
Turning to other characteristics of firms, such as average wages, the estimated 
coefficients reported in Table 6 confirm that FO pay higher wages, around 3-6 percent, 
than domestic MNEs. The second specification suggests that US- and European-owned 
firms pay higher wages than MNE
D_DC. By contrast, among domestic multinationals, 
MNE
D_LDC exhibit a different trend: the coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant across the entire distribution, except for the 10
th percentile. The results on 
firm size show that large firms pay the highest average wages. However, this  
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characteristic is more pronounced at the lower tail and in the middle of the distribution 
where the coefficients are negative and statistically significant.  
 Table 7 shows the results of capital intensity. These give no evidence of 
significant differences between FO and MNE
D. Focusing on specification (2), the 
coefficients associated with the different groups of foreign-owned firms and domestic 
multinationals are not statistically significant across quantiles, which suggests that there 
are no differences among firms in terms of capital intensity. Finally, small firms seem to 
be less capital intense than large ones, but only at the lower tail and in the middle of the 
distribution; while at the upper percentile, the value of the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant. A similar pattern is confirmed for medium firms. 
 
Table 6. Dependent variable: log Average Wage 
 QR  OLS 
 10  25  50  (Median) 75  90  Mean 
Specification 1 (Reference group: MNED)   
FO  0.055** 
(0.022) 
0.064*** 
(0.011) 
0.064*** 
(0.012) 
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.033 
(0.023) 
0.054*** 
(0.011) 
Specification 2 (Reference group: MNED_DC)   
MNED_LDC   -0.064 (0.041)  -0.070*** 
(0.021) 
-0.057*** 
(0.020) 
-0.068*** 
(0.022) 
-0.096*** 
(0.036) 
-0.073*** 
(0.020) 
MNED_Both -0.048(0.039)  0.022 
(0.022)  0.040*(0.023)  0.051* 
(0.029) 
0.094** 
(0.048) 
-0.073*** 
(0.020) 
FOUS  0.022 (0.041)  0.056*** 
(0.017) 
0.079*** 
(0.019) 
0.080*** 
(0.023) 
0.102*** 
(0.037) 
0.083*** 
(0.018) 
FOEurope 0.053  (0.034)  0.044*** 
(0.014) 
0.047*** 
(0.016) 
0.025 
(0.015) 
-0.009 
(0.030) 
0.033** 
(0.015) 
FOOther  -0.116* 
(0.067) 
-0.027 
(0.049)  0.009 (0.027)  -0.001 
(0.030) 
0.028 
(0.053) 
-0.048 
(0.032) 
 
Small   -0.117** 
(0.052) 
-0.085*** 
(0.017)  -0.039** (0.016) 0.004 
(0.015) 
0.056* 
(0.030) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
Medium   -0.083** 
(0.041) 
-0.043*** 
(0.013)  -0.034** (0.013) -0.009 
(0.016) 
0.006 
(0.025) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
Medium- Large  -0.059 (0.037)  -0.032** 
(0.014) 
-0.039*** 
(0.012) 
-0.017 
(0.016) 
-0.0001 
(0.022) 
-0.025* 
(0.013) 
Time dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs.  2981  2981  2981  2981  2981  2981 
Note: Standard error bootstrapped with 500 replications in parentheses. Robust standard errors for the OLS method. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. Mara Grasseni, Domestic Multinationals and Foreign-Owned Firms in Italy: Evidence from Quantile 
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Table 7. Dependent variable: log Capital Intensity 
 QR  OLS 
 10  25  50 
(Median) 75 90 Mean 
Specification 1 (Reference group: MNED)   
FO  -0.105 
(0.067) 
-0.018 
(0.054) 
-0.015 
(0.041) 
-0.018 
(0.046) 
-0.079 
(0.060) 
-0.073* 
(0.039) 
Specification 2 (Reference group: MNED_DC)   
MNED_LDC   0.118 
(0.137) 
-0.029 
(0.104) 
0.036 
(0.086) 
-0.140* 
(0.083) 
-0.033 
(0.114) 
0.021 
(0.077) 
MNED_Both 0.172(0.139) -0.021 
(0.098) 
0.004 
(0.089) 
0.037 
(0.101) 
0.234 
(0.147)  0.083(0.083)
FOUS  0.037 
(0.134) 
-0.096 
(0.097) 
-0.013 
(0.070) 
-0.150** 
(0.069) 
-0.016 
(0.082) 
-0.091 
(0.067) 
FOEurope  -0.033 
(0.106) 
-0.045 
(0.087) 
-0.009 
(0.065) 
-0.043 
(0.057) 
-0.071 
(0.065) 
-0.048 
(0.056) 
FOOther  0.022 
(0.316) 
0.085 
(0.115) 
0.202** 
(0.096) 
0.026 
(0.125) 
0.235 
(0.224) 
0.079 
(0.114) 
 
Small   -0.750*** 
(0.103) 
-0.412*** 
(0.090) 
-0.191*** 
(0.061) 
0.239*** 
(0.078) 
0.585*** 
(0.091) 
-0.143** 
(0.057) 
Medium   -0.418*** 
(0.101) 
-0.099 
(0.065) 
0.009 
(0.046) 
0.174*** 
(0.051) 
0.310*** 
(0.059) 
-0.060 
(0.047) 
Medium- 
Large 
-0.185** 
(0.085) 
-0.072 
(0.055) 
-0.087* 
(0.044) 
-0.029 
(0.047) 
0.042 
(0.064) 
-0.095** 
(0.041) 
Time dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector 
dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs.  2981  2981  2981  2981  2981  2981 
Note: Standard error bootstrapped with 500 replications in parentheses. Robust standard error for the OLS method. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level.  
 
The results for non-financial and financial indicators – ROS, ROI and leverage – 
are reported in Tables 8, 9 and 10.  
As regards the return on sales (ROS) dependent variable, the empirical evidence 
does not support the concern that FO firms perform better than domestic MNEs: in 
fact, the coefficient of FO dummy variable is significant, but negative, only at 10
th. By 
contrast, evidence of significant differences in ROS is provided by the second 
specification. The results suggest that foreign-owned firms are less profitable than 
MNE
D_DC but only at the lower quantiles, which is indicative that the profitability 
premia in favour of MNE
D_DC affect only firms with low levels of ROS. Among  
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domestic multinationals, those investing only in LDC exhibit a lower ROS than those 
investing only in DC. The dummy variable coefficient is always significant and negative, 
expect for the 90
th percentile, and it varies from -29.7 to -14.6 percent. Overall, the 
negative value of the coefficients with respect to each group of firms decreases as we 
move from the lower tails to the upper tails of the ROS distribution; and for foreign-
owned firms it becomes positive but not significant. However, as shown by Table 2.A in 
the Appendix, the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients of MNE
D_LDC is not 
rejected for all pairwise comparisons except in one case, which suggests that the 
profitability loss of MNE
D_LDC does not vary significantly across the conditional 
distribution. On the contrary, there is strong evidence that the value of the coefficients 
of FO firms varies across the distribution: the null hypothesis, in fact, is often rejected. 
Finally, small and medium firms exhibit a higher ROS than large ones but only at the 
lower percentile.  
Turning to ROI, the foreign-owned firms show a higher return on investment 
than domestic MNEs at the top of the distribution, 75
th and 90
th quantile, where the 
coefficients become statistically significant and positive, with a profitability advantage 
that ranges from 22.6 to 26 percent.
17 A more interesting pattern is found on looking at 
the second specification and, in particular, its results regarding FO
Europe. In this case, the 
estimated effect of European foreign ownership on ROI is negative at the lower 
quantiles and becomes positive as we move to the upper tail of the conditional 
distribution: the coefficients vary significantly from -38 to -12 percent. FO
US  and 
FO
Europe tend to be more profitable than MNE
D_DC at the top of the distribution, 75
th 
and 90
th  quantile, where the coefficients are positive and statistically significant. By 
contrast, there is no strong evidence of differences within domestic multinationals. 
Finally, small and medium firms achieve better performances than large ones. 
Overall, the results show that there are profitability gaps across and within 
multinationals, and they evidence two patterns across the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variables. In particular, if there is any difference between ROS and ROI, it 
appears to favour domestic MNEs investing only in DC at the bottom of the 
distributions; while at the top of the distributions the advantage is in favour of the 
subgroups of foreign-owned firms, especially European and US foreign ones. Within 
domestic multinationals, MNE
D_LDC confirm their worst performance at least in terms of 
ROS. 
Finally, in regard to the measure of debt leverage, the results reported in Table 10 
show a significantly lower level of debt in favour of foreign-owned firms. The value of 
the coefficients is quite high, but decreases along the distribution. This corroborates the 
widespread contention that Italian firms are highly leveraged, with a growing risk of 
bankruptcy if they are unable to make payments on their debt, and with difficulties in 
finding new lenders in the future.
18 The better performance of FO is confirmed for all 
the foreign-owned firms regardless of nationality, as shown in specification (2). The 
value of the coefficients estimated varies widely across quantiles: for example, we find 
                                                 
17 The signs of the coefficients confirm the results of the K-S tests.  
18 However, leverage in not always bad, for it allows tax savings due to paid interests and increases the 
shareholders’ return on their investment.  Mara Grasseni, Domestic Multinationals and Foreign-Owned Firms in Italy: Evidence from Quantile 
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that FO
Europe are about 47-24 percent less in debt than MNE
D_DC, and, as shown in Table 
2 in Appendix, the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients is rejected in many 
pairwise comparisons. MNE
D_LDC exhibit a higher level of leverage, which ranges from 
16 to 23 percent, but the coefficient is statistically significant only at the 25
th and 50
th 
quantile; MNEs with higher international involvement, MNE
D_Both, show better financial 
stability than MNE
D_DC. Finally, small firms are more indebted than large ones: the 
coefficient is statistically significant only at the median and at the upper quantile, but the 
effect is more pronounced at the upper tail of the conditional distribution. 
 
Table 8. Dependent variable: log ROS 
 QR  OLS 
 10  25  50 
(Median) 75 90  Mean 
Specification 1 (Reference group: MNED)   
FO  -0.317*** 
(0.089) 
-0.088 
(0.057) 
-0.026 
(0.036) 
0.046 
(0.046) 
0.084 
(0.061) 
-0.044 
(0.041) 
Specification 2 (Reference group: MNED_DC)   
MNED_LDC   -0.247* 
(0.130) 
-0.297*** 
(0.101) 
-0.146** 
(0.073) 
-0.176** 
(0.070) 
-0.153 
(0.114) 
-0.224*** 
(0.069) 
MNED_Both  -0.302 
(0.341) 
-0.210* 
(0.117) 
-0.030 
(0.098) 
0.019 
(0.101) 
0.060 
(0.167) 
-0.158 
(0.100) 
FOUS  -0.313** 
(0.153) 
-0.197** 
(0.083) 
-0.003 
(0.076) 
0.028 
(0.076) 
0.003 
(0.102) 
-0.089 
(0.068) 
FOEurope  -0.461*** 
(0.120) 
-0.273*** 
(0.070) 
-0.094* 
(0.054) 
-0.050 
(0.064) 
0.026 
(0.091) 
-0.186*** 
(0.055) 
FOOther  -0.583** 
(0.255) 
-0.314** 
(0.146) 
-0.052 
(0.171) 
0.126 
(0.117) 
-0.033 
(0.152) 
-0.141 
(0.113) 
 
Small   0.313** 
(0.156) 
0.158** 
(0.074) 
0.076 
(0.069) 
0.121* 
(0.066) 
0.052 
(0.093) 
0.132** 
(0.060) 
Medium   0.242* 
(0.141) 
0.161** 
(0.078) 
0.072 
(0.062) 
0.115* 
(0.066) 
0.056 
(0.085) 
0.118** 
(0.055) 
Medium- 
Large 
0.198 
(0.139) 
0.101 
(0.076) 
0.073 
(0.064) 
0.069 
(0.062) 
0.069 
(0.086) 
0.110* 
(0.058) 
Time dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector 
dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs.  2445  2445  2445  2445  2445  2445 
Note: Standard error bootstrapped with 500 replications in parentheses. Robust standard errors for the OLS method. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level.   
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Table 9. Dependent variable: log ROI 
 QR  OLS 
 10  25  50 
(Median) 75 90 Mean 
Specification 1 (Reference group: MNED)   
FO  -0.155 
(0.110)  -0.055 (0.053)  0.074 
(0.047) 
0.226*** 
(0.050) 
0.260*** 
(0.061) 
0.076* 
(0.044) 
Specification 2 (Reference group: MNED_DC)   
MNED_LDC   -0.207 
(0.150)  -0.034 (0.076)  -0.135* 
(0.077) 
-0.070 
(0.081) 
-0.172* 
(0.100) 
-0.128* 
(0.070) 
MNED_Both  -0.422 
(0.325)  -0.174 (0.129)  -0.023 
(0.119) 
0.002 
(0.109) 
-0.165 
(0.129) 
-0.199* 
(0.111) 
FOUS  -0.270* 
(0.162)  0.046 (0.093)  0.079 
(0.079) 
0.242*** 
(0.083) 
0.185* 
(0.105) 
0.061 
(0.073) 
FOEurope  -0.381*** 
(0.117)  -0.119* (0.067)  0.008 
(0.065) 
0.151** 
(0.071) 
0.160* 
(0.082) 
-0.030 
(0.060) 
FOOther  -0.632 
(0.419)  -0.195 (0.162)  -0.154 
(0.172) 
0.283** 
(0.139) 
0.275 
(0.230) 
-0.084 
(0.129) 
Small   0.293* 
(0.160)  0.278***(0.081)  0.155** 
(0.068) 
0.170** 
(0.075) 
0.111 
(0.087) 
0.223*** 
(0.064) 
Medium   0.235 
(0.153)  0.221** (0.088)  0.179*** 
(0.067) 
0.174** 
(0.070) 
0.121 
(0.081) 
0.203*** 
(0.060) 
Medium- 
Large 
0.250 
(0.159)  0.156* (0.086)  0.100 
(0.064) 
0.093 
(0.072) 
0.103 
(0.082) 
0.172*** 
(0.062) 
Time dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector 
dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs.  2446  2446  2446  2446  2446  2446 
Note: Standard error bootstrapped with 500 replications in parentheses. Robust standard errors for the OLS method. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. 
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Table 10. Dependent variable: log Leverage 
 QR  OLS 
 10  25  50 
(Median)  75 90 Mean 
Specification 1 (Reference group: MNED)   
FO  -0.527*** 
(0.073) 
-0.479*** 
(0.049) 
-0.275*** 
(0.057) 
-0.243*** 
(0.073) 
-0.108 
(0.094) 
-0.322*** 
(0.048) 
Specification 2 (Reference group: MNED_DC)   
MNED_LDC   0.204 
(0.149) 
0.164* 
(0.085) 
0.228** 
(0.093) 
-0.128 
(0.141) 
0.041 
(0.184) 
0.107 
(0.087) 
MNED_Both  -0.382 
(0.267) 
-0.253** 
(0.126) 
-0.159 
(0.118) 
-0.362** 
(0.182) 
-0.315* 
(0.182) 
-0.404*** 
(0.103) 
FOUS  -0.563*** 
(0.127) 
-0.494*** 
(0.081) 
-0.239** 
(0.097) 
-0.255 
(0.166) 
0.292 
(0.182) 
-0.246*** 
(0.089) 
FOEurope  -0.472*** 
(0.105) 
-0.410*** 
(0.074) 
-0.240*** 
(0.079) 
-0.437*** 
(0.126) 
-0.307** 
(0.142) 
-0.386*** 
(0.068) 
FOOther  -0.754*** 
(0.150) 
-0.599*** 
(0.179) 
-0.299 
(0.185) 
-0.440** 
(0.175) 
-0.141 
(0.245) 
-0.504*** 
(0.131) 
Small   0.072 
(0.102) 
0.068 
(0.086) 
0.166** 
(0.077) 
0.447*** 
(0.118) 
0.934*** 
(0.181) 
0.263*** 
(0.074) 
Medium   0.089 
(0.079) 
0.026 
(0.072) 
0.035 
(0.068) 
0.130 
(0.090) 
0.132 
(0.128) 
0.056 
(0.062) 
Medium- 
Large 
0.096 
(0.105) 
0.039 
(0.068) 
-0.067 
(0.068) 
0.014 
(0.087) 
-0.136 
(0.128) 
-0.045 
(0.063) 
Time dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector 
dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs.  2978  2978  2978  2978  2978  2978 
Note: Standard error bootstrapped with 500 replications in parentheses. Robust standard errors for the OLS method. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level.  
4.  Conclusion 
This paper relates to the recent literature on differences among different types of 
firms in terms of their international involvement. Using Italian firm-level data, it first 
distinguishes between domestic multinational and foreign-owned firms and then 
performs econometric analysis taking account of the source of inward FDI and the 
location of outward FDI. Identification of the nationality of foreign firms enables 
discussion of the differences among US, European and Other foreign-owned firms 
(FO
US, FO
Europe and FO
Other); and information on the country of localisation of foreign 
subsidiaries makes it possible to compare the differences among domestic  
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multinationals investing only in developed countries, investing only in less developed 
countries and investing in both (MNE
D_DC, MNE
D_LDC, MNE
D_Both). 
In addition, the study focuses the attention on several performance indicators, 
some of them hitherto unexplored, such as labour productivity, average wages, capital 
intensity, ROS, ROI and leverage.  
The econometric analysis is performed using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of 
stochastic dominance and by applying quantile regression technique that enables to 
observation of the gaps at different points of the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable. This yields a more precise picture of the heterogeneity existing 
among types of firms.  
The empirical evidence provided by our estimation do not support the hypothesis 
that foreign-owned firms outperform domestic multinationals in terms of productivity, 
and this result is in line with the existing literature on Italian firms (Castellani and Zanfei 
2006). On the contrary, the domestic multinationals investing only in developed 
countries are more productive than foreign-owned firms from Europe and Other 
countries, but the pattern is not stable across the entire conditional distribution. 
Turning to the other performance measures, foreign-owned firms pay higher 
wages than domestic MNEs, and they are less indebted. In regard to the profitability 
indicators, ROS and ROI, the results are quite mixed and suggest that foreign-owned 
firms, especially from US and Europe, are more profitable than domestic MNEs 
investing only in developed countries; but this is so only at the upper quantile, while at 
the bottom of the distribution the pattern seems reversed.  
Finally, a significant result concerns domestic multinationals. Firms that establish 
foreign subsidiaries only in less developed countries perform worse than those investing 
only in developed countries, and this trend seems confirmed by every performance 
indicator used except for capital intensity and ROI, in which cases the coefficients are 
usually not significant. MNEs are less productive, pay lower average wages, are less 
profitable and more indebted than their counterparts investing only in DC. 
Given the Helpman et al. (2004) assumption that firms choose different 
internationalisation strategies according to their ex ante productivity, the empirical 
analysis performed may suggest that domestic MNEs self-select into markets with 
different characteristics, or in other words, that the location choices of domestic MNEs 
are related to their performance. It is possible that firms with low levels of productivity 
can only afford to operate in less developed countries where competition is likely to be 
lower; or it may be that investing abroad in LDC is their only chance of survival.  
The paper does not explore the origins of performance advantages. Instead, it 
simply seeks to provide a detailed picture of the performance differences existing across 
and within multinationals and showing a large amount of heterogeneity. It suggests that 
not all multinationals are similar. This analysis is another step towards better 
understanding of multinational characteristics and invites the theoretical and empirical 
literature to investigate these issues in greater detail. Mara Grasseni, Domestic Multinationals and Foreign-Owned Firms in Italy: Evidence from Quantile 
Regression 
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Appendix 
Figure 1: Coefficients estimated across percentiles for each type of firm. 
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Table 1 Tests of equality between coefficients at different quantiles in Tables 5-7 
 
Dependent variable: 
log Labour Productivity 
Dependent variable: 
log Average Wage 
Dependent variable: 
log Capital Intensity 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
:
 
F
O
 
M
N
E
D
_
L
D
C
 
M
N
E
D
_
B
o
t
h
 
F
O
U
S
 
F
O
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
F
O
O
t
h
e
r
 
F
O
 
M
N
E
D
_
L
D
C
 
M
N
E
D
_
B
o
t
h
 
F
O
U
S
 
F
O
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
F
O
O
t
h
e
r
 
F
O
 
M
N
E
D
_
L
D
C
 
M
N
E
D
_
B
o
t
h
 
F
O
U
S
 
F
O
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
F
O
O
t
h
e
r
 
Quantiles:                         
10-25  0.91 0.34  0.89  0.81 0.73 0.73 0.63 0.86 0.44  0.33 0.77 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.10  0.25 0.90 0.82 
25-50  0.66 0.98  0.61  0.51 0.65 0.28 0.97 0.53  0.42  0.19  0.86 0.39 0.95 0.46  0.78  0.31 0.62 0.28 
50-75  0.49 0.34  0.80  0.44 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.61 0.65  0.95 0.15 0.72 0.93 0.02 0.72  0.03 0.57 0.12 
75-90  0.27 0.84  0.72  0.36 0.29 0.64 0.52 0.38  0.31  0.49  0.20 0.53 0.24 0.28  0.15  0.06 0.64 0.28 
10-50  0.91 0.44  0.85  0.90 0.60 0.39 0.68 0.86 0.83  0.14 0.85 0.05 0.17 0.54 0.21  0.71 0.82 0.56 
10-75  0.78 0.84  0.99  0.60 0.79 0.08 0.69 0.94  0.94  0.19  0.43 0.09 0.25 0.07  0.39  0.17 0.93 0.99 
10-90  0.33 0.77  0.79  0.31 0.38 0.07 0.45 0.54 0.43  0.13 0.16 0.07 0.75 0.36 0.77  0.72 0.75 0.58 
25-75  0.77 0.40  0.88  0.24 0.42 0.02 0.17 0.91  0.35  0.32  0.27 0.61 0.99 0.30  0.63  0.58 0.98 0.67 
25-90  0.26 0.67  0.71  0.12 0.12 0.03 0.19 0.52 0.15  0.20 0.09 0.39 0.40 0.98 0.13  0.48 0.79 0.52 
50-90  0.17 0.67  0.85  0.20 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.31  0.25  0.52  0.07 0.72 0.27 0.56  0.13  0.97 0.44 0.88 
P-value of F-tests.  
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Table 2 Tests of equality between coefficients at different quantiles in Tables 8-10 
  Dependent variable: log ROS  Dependent variable: log ROI  Dependent variable: log Leverage 
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Q u a n t i l e s :                   
10-25  0.01 0.67 0.77 0.38 0.06 0.22 0.29 0.19 0.38 0.02 0.01 0.21 0.46 0.75 0.56 0.51 0.50 0.33 
25-50  0.21  0.07  0.09  0.01  0.00  0.09  0.01  0.18  0.21  0.70  0.05  0.81  0.00  0.46  0.41  0.00  0.02  0.11 
50-75  0.09 0.67 0.61 0.67 0.44 0.24 0.00 0.37 0.82 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.19 0.90 0.06 0.42 
75-90  0.49  0.80  0.76  0.77  0.34  0.25  0.51  0.27  0.15  0.51  0.91  0.97  0.11  0.32  0.79  0.00  0.33  0.19 
10-50  0.00 0.44 0.41 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.63 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.88 0.34 0.02 0.04 0.02 
10-75  0.00  0.61  0.34  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.38  0.19  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.08  0.95  0.11  0.81  0.14 
10-90  0.00 0.58 0.32 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.83 0.45 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.47 0.82 0.00 0.33 0.03 
25-75  0.03  0.25  0.07  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.69  0.22  0.06  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.56  0.14  0.83  0.46 
25-90  0.03 0.31 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.23 0.96 0.26 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.51 0.75 0.00 0.49 0.11 
50-90  0.08  0.95  0.60  0.95  0.17  0.92  0.00  0.73  0.34  0.32  0.08  0.07  0.09  0.31  0.41  0.00  0.64  0.56 
P-value of F-tests.  
 